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Abstract 
This paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship that is 
susceptible to the moral hazard problem.  The optimal contractual form of licensing derived in 
the model generates predictions that seem to be consistent with actual practice.  For instance,  
the introduction of inputs that are not contractible and costly explains the prevalence of royalty 
contracts in the licensing relationship.  Moreover, the model is able to relate the size of the 
royalty rate to the parameters that represent the environments under which the concerned 
parties operate.  The framework also provides a rigorous evaluation of the recent debate on the 
issue of technology licensing and competitiveness in the global economy.  In addition, the 
difficulty that the licensor faces in controlling the use of information in the development of 
related products in the future can also explain the rationale for including grant-back clauses in 
licensing contracts.  Finally, the model can be naturally extended to analyze the choice of a 
technology holder between direct investment and licensing in an attempt to serve a foreign 
market. 
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I. Introduction 
 Licensing is a voluntary form of dissemination whereby an inventor can enjoy at least 
some of the gains to trade by availing other parties of  the use of her superior knowledge.  In the 
theory of licensing, it is almost invariably assumed that intellectual property can be viewed as a 
"public good" in that the marginal cost to the owner of transmitting information and providing 
access to it is essentially zero compared to all of the costs involved in the creation of knowledge 
(see Arrow [1962]).   In other words, either licensing is simply viewed as the right to infringe on 
patents or the knowledge is assumed to be completely codified (see Kamien [1992] for an 
excellent survey on patent licensing).  Underlying this view is a common belief that technology is 
nothing but a set of blueprints usable to all at trivial cost.1   
 In practice, however, information is often costly to transfer to other firms because 
licensing  frequently involves the services of the licensor's personnel to install and train the 
licensee’s personnel.2 In a similar vein,  for the licensee firms, it is insufficient merely to expose 
them to the relevant knowledge without their own exerted efforts to internalize such knowledge.3   
This is particularly true when knowledge is less explicit and less codified.4 In the case of an 
international technology transfer, it may further entail adaptation of the technology to a local 
market.  To render empirical supports, Teece (1977), for instance, reports that the costs of 
transferring  a production process averaged 19 percent of the total costs of the project. 
 
                                                                 
1For instance, Grossman and Helpman (1991) assume that ideas and knowledge flow costlessly and 
instantaneously across national boundaries.   
2For instance, Barton et al. (1988) claim that substantial teaching and training are usually necessary for 
technology to be transferred effectively. 
3See Kim (1993) for a discussion on absorptive capacity and its role in Korea's industrial growth. 
4Berrill (1964) points out that "only the broad outlines of technical knowledge are codified by non-personal 
means of intellectual communication".  
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 This paper presents a simple formal analysis of the licensing relationship under the 
circumstances in which effective transmission of knowledge requires costly inputs by both 
dispensing and receiving parties.   Incorporating these elements in the technology transfer 
process will be shown to shed some light on issues that cannot be handled in more conventional 
models of licensing.  These include, in particular, the prevalence of royalty contracts even in the 
absence of asymmetric information and the role of grant-back clauses under the threat of future 
competition.  In addition, the optimal contractual form of licensing derived in this model 
generates predictions that seem to be consistent with actual practice.  
 The basic premise of the paper is that the costly inputs needed for effective transmission 
of knowledge cannot be contracted directly.  These costly inputs include the efforts exerted in 
the transfer process by either party, which may not be observable to the other party.  Or they 
may be observable to the parties in the relationship but not verifiable to a third party.  
Henceforth, they are not enforceable in court.  This implies that  the process of technology 
transfer is susceptible to the moral hazard problem.  In this situation, I analyze how the optimal 
contractual form of licensing should be structured.  I assume that the contract can specify the 
lump-sum payment and/or royalty fee which depends on the verifiable quantity produced by 
using the technology licensed, and may specify the allocation of property rights on any 
forthcoming improvement based on the licensed technology.  The analysis also sheds some light 
on how the choice between licensing and direct foreign investment (DFI) as a vehicle to serve a 
foreign market is made.  It is shown that the two alternative ways of penetrating the foreign 
market present different investment incentives for the two parties involved in the technology  
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transfer process .  The choice, consequently,  depends on the relative importance of the 
investments by the two parties in the relationship. 
 The incomplete contract framework developed in this paper can also be applied to the 
case where the incompleteness of the contract stems from the fact that the nature of knowledge 
to be transferred is not well-defined that it cannot be specified exactly in the contract; the 
technology concerned contains a high tacit component which is informal and less codified.  In 
this case, there may be conflicts in the type of technology that is actually delivered and the one 
that is desired to be delivered unless the contract is designed to be incentive-compatible.  The 
analysis here provides a new perspective on the relationship between international technology 
transfer and competitiveness in the global economy.  One commonly made claim in relation to 
the international competitiveness issue is that the licensing of cutting-edge technologies can lead 
to the loss of  competitive advantage for the licensor.  This, in turn, prompted a popular view 
that sees the licensing of frontier technologies to foreign firms as a cardinal sin from the 
perspective of protectionists.  In this regard, it may seem natural that we witness tendencies to 
withhold the best technologies by U.S. firms.  How plausible this explanation may be, the logic 
behind the argument, however, contains gaps because it begs the question of why the licensing 
firm cannot negotiate and extract more surplus if there is any additional gains for the licensee in 
future competition due to the transfer of the frontier technology.  The incomplete contract 
approach in this paper will make explicit  the mechanism by which the transfer of cutting-edge 
technology is hindered.  Then, I demonstrate how the grant-back clause can relax the incentive 
compatibility constraint and can facilitate the transfer of the best technology available.   
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 In spirit, this paper is closely related to a recent paper by Aghion and Tirole (1994)  
who open the black box of "the management of innovation" from an organizational point of view.  
Using the incomplete contract framework pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986), they 
demonstrate that incorporating the imperfections of the innovation market explicitly in the 
analysis can generate useful insights on the management of innovation.  The analysis of 
technology transfer in this paper is another step in that direction.   
 The problem arising in this paper is also related to "moral hazard in teams" analyzed by 
Holmstrom (1982).  The focus of his paper, however, is rather different.  He emphasizes the 
central role of a principal who can break the balanced-budget constraint and enforce group 
punishment self-imposed by the team members in order to prevent the free-rider problem.  In 
the context of the licensor-licensee relationship, it is not obvious who can play the role of the 
principal.  More importantly, his analysis is of limited value in the licensing relationship because 
the profits from technology transfer may be fungible by the licensee.  Unless the profit from using 
the licensed technology is directly verifiable, the optimal incentive scheme in Holmstrom may be 
inapplicable.   
 Finally, Gallini and Wright (1990) provide an analysis of licensing in the presence of 
asymmetric information.  They explain the royalty rate in the contract as a signaling device for the 
licensor.  In contrast, my model focuses on the moral hazard problem.  The relative applicability 
of these two models will depend on the circumstances under which licensing takes place.  
Therefore, these two models should be viewed as complementary rather than competing.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way.  In section II, I set up a 
basic model.  Section III uses the basic framework to analyze the choice between DFI 
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and licensing.  The choice is shown to depend crucially on the relative importance of investment 
efforts by the licensor and the licensee.  Section IV concerns the dynamic consequences of 
licensing and provides a rationale for the inclusion of the so-called grant-back clause.  Section V 
contains concluding remarks.  
 
II. The Model 
 I consider a technology transfer between two firms located in two different countries.   I 
assume that these two national markets are segmented.  Therefore, there is no direct competition 
between the licensor and the licensee in the same market.  This assumption spares an analysis of 
the competitive effect of licensing.5  I also assume that the technology is already established and 
the commercial value of it is proven in the licensor's country when the licensing takes place.  
Therefore, there is no informational asymmetry regarding the value of technology.6  In addition, I 
assume that the technology is licensed to only one firm in a given market.7  This is consistent with 
the assumption of costly technology transfer, which can be regarded as a fixed cost of 
production. 
 Contrary to a common belief that technology transfer is costless, the value of resources 
that have to be employed to ensure a successful transfer of technology can be substantial.8   
Accordingly, I depart from the previous literature in assuming that the effective transfer of 
technology entails both transmission and absorption costs incurred by the licensor and the 
                                                                 
5Licensing to other firms operating in the same market invites tough competition and lowers the industry's 
profit.  Katz and Shapiro (1985) analyzes the conditions under which licensing increases the industry's profit 
and, therefore,licensing occurs between firms in the same market. 
6Gallini and Wright (1990) deal with the issue of informational asymmetry in the licensing relationship. 
7This assumption is in accord with Firestone's (1971) finding that most licenses are sold to a single firm.   
8 In  Teece’s (1977) study on 26 international technology projects, the transfer costs ranged from 2% to 59% 
of total project cost.    
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licensee, respectively.  This leads me to assume that there are two indispensable and 
relationship-specific investments provided by the licensor and the licensee.  Let s and b  denote 
the efforts supplied by the licensor and the licensee, respectively, in the process of technology 
transfer.  The candidates for s include pre-start-up training costs and advisory services 
provided by the licensor to expedite the licensee's acquisition of technological capability.  
Similarly, b  represents the effort of the licensee to assimilate the foreign technology to a local 
market.9   Kim and Dahlman [1992], for instance, report that local efforts to assimilate, adapt 
and improve imported technology are crucial  to successful technology transfer.   
  I assume that the constant marginal cost realized after technology transfer can be written 
as c(b,s) with ¶c(s, b)/¶s < 0 and ¶c(s, b)/¶b <0.  It is assumed that  s and b  are not 
contractible.  The contract can be contingent only on the verifiable quantity of the product that 
incorporates the licensed technology.  Let me denote p(c) as the (reduced) profit function when 
the constant marginal cost is given by c.  Both parties are assumed to be risk-neutral and have 
reservation utility of zero.   
 Let s* and  b* be the first-best effort levels for the licensor and the licensee.  They are 
derived from 
 Max
s b,
 p[c(s, b)] -s - b       (1) 
The first-order condition for optimality is given by: 
 p '[c(s*, b*)] ¶ s b
¶s
c( *, *)
 = p '[c(s*, b*)] ¶ s b
¶b
c( *, *)
 = 1   (2) 
If a complete contract can be written, the first best outcome can easily be attained.  Suppose 
that there are many potential licensees.  As a result, the licensor has the  
                                                                 
9 See Teece (1977) for categorization of technology transfer costs.  
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bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the licensee.  The distribution of the 
bargaining power has no consequences for efficiency in my framework since I do not assume 
any cash constraint for either party.10  Then, the optimal contract specifies s* and b* and all the 
surplus from the licensing relationship will be extracted by a fixed fee.   Note that if a complete 
contract can be written (s and b  are contractible), the optimal contract requires the royalty rate 
to be set at zero.  The reason is that the royalty rate artificially changes the licensee's effective 
marginal cost (MC) different from the true MC and thereby induces an inefficient production 
decision.   
 In practice, however, licensing contracts are predominantly royalty-based.11   This 
discrepancy with empirical data can be reconciled by assuming that inputs for technology 
transfer are not contractible.  If the effectiveness of technology transfer depends on the efforts 
provided by both parties and these efforts are not contractible, the first-best outcome cannot be 
implemented.  I assume that the contract can specify only the output-dependent royalty fee and 
any lump-sum transfer.  In this case, it will be shown that the optimal licensing contract includes 
a royalty rate, which serves as a hostage to induce the licensor to exert costly efforts.12   
 To see this, suppose that the licensing contract included only the fixed fee. Then, the 
licensor would have no incentive to exert any costly efforts in the technology transfer process; if 
we normalize the minimum level of efforts by the licensor and the licensee that can be enforced 
                                                                 
10 In contrast, in Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Aghion and Tirole (1994), ex ante bargaining power 
influences the size of the total profits as well as the distribution of them due to the cash constraint facing 
one of the parties to the contract.   
11According to Rostoker (1984),  licensing with fixed fee alone  was used only 13 percent of the time.  In 
contrast, royalty plus fixed fee licensing was used 46 percent of time and royalty alone was used 39 percent 
of time. 
12 If the transfer of technology is costless and, consequently multiple licenses can be given, the inefficient 
price effect of the royalty rate can be mitigated by competition among several licensees.  
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to be zero, we have s=0.13  The licensee, then, maximizes 
  Max
b
 p[c(0, b)] - b        (3) 
and the first-order condition for b  satisfies ¶p[c(0, b)]/¶b  = 1. 
 Now suppose that the contract includes a royalty rate of r.  Then, the effort levels for the 
licensor and the licensee are determined in the following way.  Let P(.) be the inverse demand 
function and q(c) be the profit maximizing level of output when the marginal cost is given by c, 
i.e., q(c) = argmax [P(q)q - cq] and satisfies the first-order condition P'q + P = c.  Note that by 
the envelope theorem,  
 p '(c) = -q(c)            (4) 
The licensor's effort level given the royalty rate r is derived from14: 
 Max
s
yS(s, b; r) = Max
s
 rq[c(s, b) + r] -s        
or 
 rq'[c(s, b) + r] ¶c(s, b)/¶s - 1 = 0      (5) 
The licensee's effort level is the solution to the following maximization problem: 
 Max
b
 yB(s, b; r) = Max
b
 p[c(s, b) + r] - b 
or 
 p '[c(s, b) + r] ¶c(s, b)/¶b  - 1 = 0      (6) 
The equilibrium level of effort levels, can be derived by solving (5) and (6) simultaneously, i.e., 
 rq'[c(s*, b*) + r]¶ s b
¶s
c( *, *)
 = p '[c(s*, b*) + r] ¶ s b
¶b
c( *, *)
 = 1  (7) 
 
 
                                                                 
13 Alternatively, as in Aghion and Tirole (1994), the minimum level of effort could be driven by “intellectual 
curiosity, ego, career concerns, and prospects of informal rewards.” 
14Superscripts S and B denote the licensor (seller) and the licensee (buyer), respectively. 
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Let s(r) and  b(r) be the noncooperative equilibrium levels of efforts for the licensor and 
licensee, respectively, given that the royalty rate is r.  The optimal royalty rate r* is set to 
maximize the joint industry profit: 
 Max
r
 p[c(s(r), b(r)) + r] + rq[c(s(r), b(r)) + r] -s(r) - b(r)   (8) 
Using the first-order conditions for the licensor and the licensee (Eq. (5) and (6)) and (4), the 
derivative of the joint profit with respect to the royalty rate r is given by: 
 -q
¶
¶s
c s'  +rq' ¶
¶b
c b '  +rq' = 0       (9) 
 The choice of the optimal royalty rate is based on two considerations.  The first two 
terms in Eq.(9) represent the "incentive" effects whereas the last term represents "output 
contraction" effect of increasing the royalty rate.  More specifically, a higher royalty rate induces 
more effort by the licensor since a lower cost for the licensee implies a higher royalty income for 
the licensor.   In the Appendix, it is proved that s'(r) is positive for sufficiently small positive 
values of r if the stability condition for the equilibrium effort levels is assumed.  This positive 
incentive effect for the licensor is represented by the first term in (9).   The second term 
represents the effect of an increase in the royalty rate on the licensee's incentive, the sign of 
which is in general ambiguous.15  Finally, the royalty rate introduces an artificial wedge between 
the effective MC and the true MC; the effective MC (true MC +royalty rate) is increased for the 
licensee and as a result the output is reduced.  The third term in (9) represents this negative 
effect of output contraction.  The tradeoff between these two  "incentive" and "output 
contraction" effects will determine the optimal royalty rate.  When the left hand side of Eq. (9) is 
evaluated at r=0, it is positive since the second and the third terms disappear.  This implies that 
                                                                 
15The sign will depend on, inter alia, whether b and s are complementary or substitute to each other. 
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for a small value of the royalty rate, the positive incentive effect for the licensor dominates the 
incentive effect for the licensee and the output contraction effect.  Consequently, I can conclude 
that the optimal royalty rate is positive if I assume that the maximand of (8) is a well-defined 
concave function of r.  
 My model is also consistent with Taylor and Silberston's (1973) finding that royalty rates 
are positively related to the amount of know-how supplied and the cost of supplying it and that 
royalties are higher for products subject to price-inelastic demands.  To see the effect of 
demand elasticity on the optimal royalty rate, we can rewrite the first order condition (9) as 
follows. 
 r* = 
q
q
c
c'
'
'
¶
¶s
s
¶
¶b
b1+
æ
è
ç
ç
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
÷
÷
 
 
Let me assume that the demand function has a constant price elasticity of e = -D'p/D, i.e., D(p) 
=Ap-e, e>1.  Define p(c) as the monopolist's profit maximizing choice of price when the 
marginal cost is given by c, i.e. p(c) = (e-1)c/e.   Note that q(c) = D(p(c)) which implies that 
q'(c) = D'(p(c))p'(c).  Then, 
 r* = -
c
c
ce
¶
¶s
s
¶
¶b
b
'
'1+
æ
è
ç
ç
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
÷
÷
       (10) 
 
Therefore, there is an inverse relationship between the elasticity of demand and the optimal 
royalty rate.  The reason is that as demand becomes more inelastic, the negative effects of 
output contraction due to a higher royalty rate become smaller.  
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 It should be mentioned that the exclusive focus on the linear royalty payment scheme in 
this paper does not entail any loss of generality because any outcome induced by a nonlinear 
schemes can be replicated by a linear one.  Consider the second-best contract with a general 
royalty payment of R(q).  (I considered only the case where R(q) =rq in the paper.)  Let ( ~s ,
~
b, 
~q ) be the outcome induced by this scheme.  Then, it can be easily verified, by comparing the 
first-order conditions, that the same outcome can be achieved using a linear scheme with the 
royalty rate of r = R'( ~q ) accompanied by an appropriate adjustment of the fixed fee. 
 
Proposition 1.  If a complete contract can be written, the optimal licensing contract will include 
only a fixed fee.  If the effort levels in the transmission of knowledge cannot be contracted for, 
the optimal contract also includes a royalty rate which is determined by the trade-off  between 
the "incentive"  and "output contraction" effects.  
 
Remark.  The royalty contract can be susceptible to renegotiation if the efforts are expended 
only at the inception of a licensing relationship which lasts for a relatively long time; once the  
efforts are provided both parties have incentives to eliminate the royalty rate from the contract.  
In this case, the optimal contract can resemble a sliding royalty scheme.  However, if the efforts 
must be provided continuously for effective operation of the licensee firm as in a service 
contract, renegoiation is not an issue.  For example, the licensor's efforts can represent 
maintenance efforts over time, the promptness of the licensor's after-sales service to recurrent 
operational problems, and on-going training in problem-solving techniques. 
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 It is worth mentioning complementary work by Gallini and Wright (1990) who also 
provide a theory as to why a royalty contract can be optimal.   In their model, the innovator has 
private information regarding the quality of the technology that is licensed.  In this case, the 
inclusion of a royalty rate serves as a signal of the quality of the technology.    The situation 
considered in their paper is most appropriate when there is an independent inventor who tries to 
sell his technology to a firm with manufacturing capability.  In this case, the technology has never 
been tested in the market.  In other words, the moral hazard problem is responsible for the 
inclusion of a royalty rate in my model whereas adverse selection is the main reason in Gallini 
and Wright.  Asymmetric information, however, is less plausible in the context of international 
technology transfer where the technology has already been proven in the licensor's country and 
therefore, the quality is more or less known to the potential licensee.16    
 
III. Licensing versus Direct Investment 
 Up to now I restricted the option to serve a foreign market only to licensing.  An 
alternative way to penetrate a foreign market is to set up a subsidiary in the foreign country via 
direct investment.  The framework can be naturally extended to analyze a firm's decision to 
serve a foreign market by licensing or direct foreign investment (DFI).   Let me assume that 
even with direct investment through a subsidiary, a local manager is indispensable for the 
successful operation of the subsidiary.   We interpret b  as investments by a locally recruited 
manager.  In this context, b includes efforts to adapt the technology to local market conditions, 
clear local government regulations, and aid the enforcement of intellectual property rights of the  
 
                                                                 
16 If there is any asymmetric information in our context, the chances are that the licensee would have 
superior information regarding local market conditions. 
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parent company, etc.  With direct investment, however, the benefits of investment by a local 
manager accrue to the multinational firm.  Therefore, the local manager has no incentive to exert 
efforts; investment in b  will be zero.  The multinational firm maximizes  
 Max
b
 p[c(s, 0)] - s 
and the first-order condition for s satisfies ¶p[c(s, 0)]/¶s = 1. 
 In my framework, therefore, the relative attractiveness of the two approaches to 
penetrating a foreign market will depend on the relative importance of b  and s in the technology 
transfer process.  Licensing will be chosen over DFI if the marginal efficiency of the licensee’s 
efforts is relatively large compared to that of the licensor's.   If the licensor’s effort is relatively 
more important in the transfer process, DFI would be favored because it is necessary to include 
an inordinately high royalty rate in a licensing contract to induce a proper level of licensor 
effort.17 This prediction is consistent with the evidence that multinationals tend to be important in 
products that are technically complex (Caves [1982] and Markusen [1995]). 
 
Proposition 2.  The preferred mode of entry into a foreign market depends on the relative 
importance of efforts by the dispensing and receiving parties in technology transfer.   
Licensing is preferred to DFI if the licensee's efforts are relatively more important than the 
licensor's. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
17 If profits are verifiable, DFI may involve equity participation by the licensee.  In this case, the level of 
equity participation will also reflect the relative importance of  the marginal efficiencies of the two types of 
efforts. 
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 In a recent paper, Horstman and Markusen (1995) also compare relative merits of 
direct investment vs. an arm’s length arrangement such as licensing in a model where a local 
agent possesses superior information regarding market conditions.   Use of a local agent 
insulates the multinational firm from the downside risk of deploying assets in a market that may 
not be large enough to justify direct investment.  However, the multinational firm has to give up 
informational rents to the local agent to induce self-selection.  The mode of entry in their paper, 
therefore, is determined by the tradeoff between the benefits of information gathering and the 
cost of informational rents through the agency arrangement.  They conclude that direct 
investment is the desirable mode of entry when the market is on average large and there is little 
down-side risk in expected profits.  Both Horstman and Markusen’s and my papers emphasize 
agency costs in a contractual relationship.  However, the sources of agency costs differ across 
models.  My model focuses on the moral hazard aspect of the agency relationship whereas they 
are interested in the adverse selection problem.18 
 
IV. Dynamic Effects of Licensing: the "Boomerang" Effect and Grant-Back Clauses 
 Huge current-account deficits, coupled with the erosion of United States' (U.S.) 
supremacy in the high-technology industries, have prompted both academicians and practitioners 
to search for ways to restore the competitive edge of the U.S. in the global market.  Many 
theories have been put forth to explain what was responsible for the decline of U.S. 
                                                                 
18 I should mention that in an earlier paper, Horstman and Markusen (1987) provides a theory of the 
multinational’s mode of entry based on agency costs due to moral hazard.  In their model, there is imperfect 
information in the product market, which make consumers’ purchase decision depend on the reputations of 
the products.  Agency costs of licensing stem from the fact that a licensee does not fully appropriate the 
returns from maintaining the multinational firm’s brand reputation.  Their paper focus on one-sided moral 
hazard on the part of the licensee whereas this paper concerns two-sided moral hazard problem and the 
relative importance between the two. 
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competitiveness, together with prescriptions to reverse the trend [see, for instance, Dertouzos, 
Lester, and Solow (1989)].   
 Technology transfer to foreign firms has been one of the popular culprits blamed for the 
erosion of U.S. supremacy.  In this section, I analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on the 
competitiveness of the licensor and examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses.  
Of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing 
relationship and how the "grant-back" clause can mitigate this distortion.  In the process, I 
evaluate the validity of the casual argument we often hear in relation to international technology 
transfer.   
 According to this argument, myopic U.S. firms sold their future by  licensing the state-
of-the-art technologies for short-term profits.  As a result,  they lost ground to their competitors 
in the succeeding generation of  technological development.  The VCR and the semiconductor 
are two prominent examples.  In this context, it is not surprising to witness a recent trend to 
safeguard the cutting-edge technologies by the U.S. firms; once burned, they are anxious not to 
repeat the same mistake.  As a response to this problem, it has also been suggested that a 
"technology flowback" provision in the contract that requires the licensee to share any advances 
or improvements in the licensed technology with the licensor, might remedy the licensor's 
problem of losing competitive advantage to the licensee in product development (see Shapiro 
(1985) and Rothstein and Willgohs [1988]).  In fact, Caves et al. (1983) report that 43 percent 
of licensing agreements contain such grant-back clauses. 
 Notwithstanding the plausibility of the argument above, a closer inspection reveals that 
the logic behind it is incomplete in many respects.  I argue that the possibility of  
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leapfrogging by the potential licensee in and of itself cannot be the reason for withholding the 
frontier technologies.  The reason is that if this possibility is foreseen by the parties concerned, 
the licensor can be potentially compensated for any future loss of competitiveness due to the 
technology transfer.  Therefore, the current theory, if there is one, is deficient for it fails to reveal 
the logical steps that carry it from the possibility of leapfrogging by the licensee to the reluctance 
of the licensor to transfer the cutting-edge technologies. 
 To make my point, I first demonstrate that if a complete contract can be written, the 
best available technology will always be licensed simply because it enables the licensee to 
produce more efficiently; the first-best outcome is achieved and grant-back clauses are not 
necessary.   This leads me to conclude that the real reason for the failure of licensing originates 
from the inability of the parties to the licensing relationship to write a complete contract.   
Without a commitment mechanism for the licensor, the contract should be incentive compatible 
for the best technology to be transferred in order to prevent ex post opportunism.   It will be 
shown that if the cost of the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) is too high, the best 
technology will not be transferred.  Then, I analyze the mechanism by which the ICC can be 
relaxed with grant-back clauses. 
 To formalize the idea, I assume that there are two types of technology that can be 
licensed: the core and the peripheral technologies.   The core technology differs from the 
peripheral technology in two respects.  First, the core technology is superior to the peripheral in 
that it enables the licensee to produce at a lower cost; the production cost with the core 
technology is c  while the production cost with the peripheral technology is c , where c  < c .   
In addition, the transfer of core technology may enable the licensee to  
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develop a future generation of related product and may create a competitor to the licensor in the 
future.19 
 To determine which type of technology will be transferred in the licensing relationship, it 
is necessary to describe the nature of future competition.  To accommodate the possibility of 
future competition, consider a two period model (see Figure 1).  
  
 
 The licensortransfers
the core or
the peripheral
technology
Production 
competition for 
the next generation 
of the product. 
.
takes place.
If the core technology
was transferred, 
the licensee wins 
the competition 
with probability  
The new product
with market value of V
is sold.
Period 1 Period 2
Instantaneous R&D
q.  
 Figure 1. Timing of the Licensing and R&D Competition. 
 
 Once there is a transfer of the core technology, there will be a race to be the first one to 
develop a new generation of the product which will render the old product obsolete.  The new 
product is assumed to be sold in the second period.  The R&D competition occurs in the 
intervening period between the end of the first period and the beginning of the second period.  
                                                                 
19Rockett (1990) also allows the licensor to choose which versions of the technology to license when the 
licensor and the licensee are duopolists competing in the same market.  In her paper, the quality of the 
licensed technology affects the licensee's ability to imitate.  Different versions of the technology, however, 
are fully characterized by their corresponding marginal costs.  Therefore, the effects of the quality of 
licensed technology and the grant-back clause on future product development are not considered.        
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The value of winning the race is V.  The loser gets nothing.20  The first one to develop captures 
the whole value because further entry is blocked by the patent.  Alternatively, the assumption of 
Bertrand competition and a small sunk cost of entry will ensure no further entry.   
 I assume that the transfer of the core technology endows the licensee with the ability to 
win in the future competition with probability q.   For instance, we can imagine a situation in 
which the licensee's hazard rate of innovation with the transfer of the core technology is given by 
l, which parametrizes the ability of the licensee to absorb the technology (see Cohen and 
Levinthal [1989]).   However, with the transfer of peripheral technology, the licensee cannot 
succeed in the development of the new technology  regardless of its ability level.21  Let m denote 
the hazard rate for the licensor.  Then, q = l /(l + m).   Since there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between q and l, henceforth, I will parametrize the absorptive capacity with q 
when the core technology is transferred.  
 Let S
COREf  and B
COREf   denote the expected future (second period) payoffs for the 
licensor (seller) and the licensee (buyer) when the core technology is transferred.  Then, 
abstracting away from discounting and R&D costs, we have22:   
 S
COREf  = (1- q)V,  B
COREf   = qV     (11) 
In contrast, with the transfer of the peripheral technology, the licensor captures the market with 
                                                                 
20The payoff structure of "the-winner-takes-it-all" is not necessary for  my argument.  All we need is that  
the winner's payoff is larger than that of the loser and the game exhibits the feature of a race.  If the payoff 
structure is reversed and the game is one of waiting, there is no need to worry about the transfer of the core 
technology.   
21More generally, I could have assumed that the hazard rates for the licensee are given by f(l) and g(l) 
when the core and the peripheral technologies are transferred, respectively, without altering any qualitative 
results.  Then, the main argument that follows will be valid if we assume that h(l) = f(l) - g(l)  is increasing  
in l. 
22Once again, this assumption is not crucial and is made only for expositional simplicity.  We can easily 
construct a full-fledged R&D model that accounts for R&D cost and discounting without affecting any 
qualitative results that follow. 
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probability one since there is no danger of being preempted by the licensee.  Therefore, the 
future payoffs when the peripheral technology is transferred are: 
 S
PERIf  = V,   B
PERIf   = 0     (12) 
Let CORER (r) and PERIR  (r) be the royalty income for the licensor when the royalty rate is r:  
 CORER (r) = r q(c + r), PERIR  (r) = r q(c + r)     (13) 
 Now suppose that a complete contract can be written specifying which type of 
technology will be transferred.  If the core technology is transferred with the royalty rate of r, the 
payoffs for the licensor, excluding fixed fee component, are S
COREf + CORER (r)  = (1- q)V + r 
q(c + r).  In addition, the licensor can extract the licensee's payoffs from the technology transfer 
in the form of a fixed fee, which is given by: 
  COREF = p(c + r) + qV       (14)   
Therefore, the licensor's payoffs with the transfer of the core technology are:  
 COREP ( )q = CORER (r) + COREF  + SCOREf  
                        = r q(c + r) + [p(c + r) + qV] + (1- q)V  = r q(c + r) + p(c + r) + V 
CORE
P  will be maximized when royalty rate, r,  is set at zero since by using the envelope 
theorem, we have d[r q(c + r) + p(c + r)]/dr = q'(c + r) <0.  Since any efficiency gain by the 
licensee can be extracted by a fixed fee, there is no reason to distort the licensee's effective MC 
by introducing a royalty rate.  Therefore, the payoff for the licensor when the core technology is 
transferred is given by: 
 COREP ( )q = p(c ) + V       (15) 
Note that COREP ( )q  is independent of q.  The reason is that any loss of competitive advantage 
by the licensor will be exactly offset by the corresponding increase in the fixed fee.   
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 Similarly, I can derive the payoffs for the licensor when the peripheral technology  
is transferred.   The payoff for the licensee which can be extracted as a fixed fee is: 
 PERIF  = p(c )  + B
PERIf  = p(c )      (16) 
In this case also, the royalty rate will be set at zero for the same reason.  Therefore, 
the payoff from transferring the peripheral technology is given by: 
 PERIP ( )q  = PERIR  (0) + PERIF   + SPERIf  
                  = p(c ) + V       (17) 
 Since p(c ) > p(c ), the licensor will always prefer to transfer the core technology.  This 
vindicates my claim that the possibility of losing future competition alone cannot explain the 
nonoccurrence of technology transfer in the core technology as future competition from the 
licensee becomes more formidable.  The intuition is quite simple.  Since the licensor can extract 
all the surplus from the licensee via a fixed fee, the first-best outcome is achieved by maximizing 
the available pie in the relationship, which stipulates that the most efficient technology be 
transferred at the royalty rate of zero.       
 
Proposition 3.  With a complete contract, the core technology will be always transferred 
regardless of the consideration of future competition.   
 
 Proposition 3 suggests that the failure to transfer the core technology is a result of  
the inability of the concerned parties to write a complete contract.  More specifically,  
assume that the license contract cannot specify which types of technology will be  
transferred.  Even though which elements of the technology constitute the core component  
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may be well-understood by the parties to the relationship, they may be difficult to convey to a 
third party.  Consequently, what type of technology was actually transferred may not be easily 
verifiable in court.  In this case, for the core technology to be transferred it should be incentive 
compatible.  The incentive compatibility constraint for the licensor to transfer the core 
technology is: 
 CORER (r) + S
COREf   ³ PERIR  (r) + S
PERIf , or 
 CORER (r) - PERIR  (r) = r[q(c + r) - q(c + r)] ³ qV = S
PERIf  - S
COREf   (18) 
In other words, the increase in royalty income by transferring the core technology should be 
sufficiently large to overcome the decrease in the profit due to future competition.  Note that if 
there is no future consideration due to the transfer of the core technology (i.e.,  S
PERIf  - S
COREf = 
0), the incompleteness of the contract does not cause any inefficiencies. Specifying any 
arbitrarily small royalty rate will make the transfer of the core technology to be incentive 
compatible.  In other words, the possibility of future competition is a necessary condition for the 
failure of transferring the core technology to occur even though it alone cannot be a sufficient 
condition, as we have seen above in Proposition 3. 
 The effect of the royalty rate on the gap in royalty incomes between the core and the 
peripheral technologies can be derived as: 
 d[ CORER (r) - PERIR  (r)]/dr = [q(c + r) - q(c + r)] + r[q'(c + r) - q'(c + r)] (19) 
When (19) is evaluated at r=0, it is positive; the gap in royalty incomes increases at least  
initially as the royalty rate becomes positive.  To avoid unnecessary complications, let me 
assume that sup[ CORER (r) - PERIR  (r)] > V.23  This ensures that there exists a royalty rate r  
                                                                 
23This assumption is made purely to simplify exposition and is not necessary.  If this assumption is violated, 
there is a critical value q  where  sup[ CORER (r) - PERIR  (r)] =q V.  Then, the incentive compatibility 
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that can satisfy the ICC for all qÎ[0,1].   Let r*(q) be the minimum royalty rate that satisfies the 
ICC.  Note that the existence of a royalty rate that satisfies the ICC does not necessarily imply 
that the core technology will be transferred.  The reason is that  r*(q) is increasing in q, reflecting 
the fact that the ICC becomes more costly to satisfy as the possibility of leapfrogging increases.  
If the ICC is too costly to satisfy,  the licensor may opt to transfer the peripheral technology.   
 When the core technology is transferred with royalty rate r*(q), the licensor extracts the 
payoff for the licensee via a fixed fee which is given by p[c + r*(q)] + B
COREf :   
 PERIF  = p[c + r*(q)] + B
COREf   = p[c + r*(q)] + qV   (20) 
Therefore, given the probability of losing the future competition q, the payoff for the licensor 
from transferring the core technology can be written as: 
 COREP ( )q  = CORER (r) + COREF  + SCOREf  
        = r*(q)q[c + r*(q)] + p[c + r*(q)] + V   (21) 
When the peripheral technology is transferred, the payoff is the same as in the complete contract 
case since there is no additional incentive constraint to be satisfied. 
 PERIP ( )q  = PERIR  (0) + PERIF  + SPERIf   = p(c ) + V   (22) 
By using the envelope theorem, I can derive  
 
CORE
d
d
P ( )q
q
 =  r*(q)q'[c + r*(q)] r*'(q) <0    (23) 
Since PERIP ( )q  is constant and independent of q, there is a unique q* such that  
COREP ( )q > PERIP ( )q  if and only if q <q*.  If no such q* exists, set  q* =1. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
constraint can be met for all q £q .  All the analysis that follows, then, can be applied to this restricted 
region.   
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 This result can explain why there will be less transfer of the core technology as the 
capability of the licensee to develop a new product increases.  It can also be shown that, given 
the ability of the licensee q, the ICC is more difficult to satisfy as V becomes larger.  This implies 
that as the value of winning future competition becomes more important, the core technology will 
be transferred less often.   These predictions are consistent with the protectionist arguments that 
advocate safeguarding the cutting-edge technology.   
 However, it is important to understand why transferring the core technology becomes 
less attractive for the licensor as the probability of leapfrogging and the value of future 
competition get larger.   A simple explanation that the licensor gets more cautious in safeguarding 
her frontier technology to maintain her dominant position begs the question of why the expected 
loss of the licensor cannot be compensated via a fixed fee if the licensee's competitive gains 
come at the expense of the licensor.  Indeed, in Proposition 3, I demonstrated that any loss of 
competitive edge that accompanies the transfer of the core technology can be compensated via 
a fixed fee.  In my model, the reason lies in the cost of satisfying the ex post ICC due to the 
inability to write a complete contract.  According to my model, therefore, it is not a mistake for 
the licensor to transfer the core technology even when she loses future competition to the 
licensee to whom her core technology has been transferred.  It could have been a calculated risk 
taken by a rational decision-maker.   
 My model can also shed some light on the mechanism by which a "grant-back" clause 
can facilitate the transfer of the core technology; it relaxes the ICC.  To analyze the effect of the 
grant-back clause on the incentive to transfer the core technology, let me assume that V 
comprises two components, VB and VS (V=VB + VS).   VB and VS denote the values of the 
new product in the licensee's and licensor's local markets, respectively.   The grant-back clause 
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stipulates that any improvements derived from the licensed technology by the licensee be 
assigned to the licensor.   However, they may be used by the licensee without any additional 
licensee fee or royalty (Areeda [1981]).  In such an event, the licensor and licensee will capture 
their own local markets if we assume a Bertrand type competition and a small sunk cost of entry 
into the other's market.   Therefore, with the inclusion of the "grant-back" clause in the licensing 
contract, the future payoffs from transferring the core technology are24: 
 
S
CORE~f  = (1- q)V + qVS ,  B
CORE~f   = qVB    (11)' 
The future payoff from the peripheral technology is the same as before (
S
PERI~f = S
PERIf =V, 
B
PERI~f  
= B
PERIf   = 0) because the grant-back clause has no consequences in this case.   
 The ICC for the licensor to transfer the core technology can be rewritten as: 
 CORER (r) + S
CORE~f   ³ PERIR  (r) + S
PERI~f , or 
 CORER (r) - PERIR  (r) = r[q(c + r) - q(c + r)] ³ qVB = S
PERI~f  - S
CORE~f  (18)' 
Let ~r *(q) be the minimum royalty rate to satisfy the ICC given the probability of losing future 
competition q.  Since the incentive compatibility has been relaxed with the grant-back clause 
(VB < V), we have ~r *(q) <r*(q). The payoff from transferring the core technology can be 
written as: 
 
CORE~ ( )P q  = p[c + ~r *(q)] +r*(q)q[c + ~r *(q)] + V   (21)' 
The payoff from transferring the peripheral technology is the same as before: 
     
PERI~ ( )P q  =
PERIP ( )q  = p(c ) + V     (22)' 
Let 
~
q *  be the unique value such that 
CORE~ ( )P q  >
PERI~ ( )P q  if and only if q <
~
q *.   The fact 
                                                                 
24Variables corresponding to the case with a grant-back clause are denoted with tilde. 
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that  ~r *(q) <r*(q) implies that ~q *> q*.  Consequently, grant-back clauses can be beneficial 
for the licensor in two respects.   First, the grant-back clause allows the core technology to be 
transferred for a wider range of parameters.   For parameter values q Î(q*, ~q *], the core 
technology will not be transferred without the grant-back clause. Second, for q <q*, the grant-
back clause is not necessary for the core technology to be transferred.  The grantback clause, 
however, reduces the royalty rate and induces a more efficient output level (see Figure 2).   
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PERIP ( )q = 
PERI~ ( )P q                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                   
 
                                                                                          
COREP ( )q  
 
 
                                                      q*                  q**                                                    q 
 
         
 
The parameter region in which the inclusion of the grant-back clause is needed for the core 
technology to be transferred. 
 
Figure 2.  The Effect of the Grant-Back Clause in the Licensing of the Core Technology 
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Proposition 4.  Inclusion of a royalty rate is necessary for the transfer of the core technology to 
be  ex post  incentive-compatible if the type of technology to be trasnferred cannot be specified 
in the contract.  As the value of winning future competition becomes more important, the 
incentive compatibility constraint becomes more costly to satisfy.  As a result, the transfer of 
core technology is observed less often.  Grantback clauses allow the core technology to be 
transferred in a wider parameter space by relaxing the ICC. 
 
 It should be mentioned that my model abstracted from two important considerations in 
the analysis  of the grant-back clause.   First, the model was devoid of any strategic R&D 
competition; innovation was implicitly assumed to occur by chance.  Therefore, the only effect of 
the grant-back clause was an indirect one; grant-back clauses relax the ICC, which in turn 
affects the current production decision through the royalty rate.  If I introduce R&D costs which 
vary with the intensity level, the inclusion of the grant-back clause may have the direct effect of 
dulling the incentive for the licensee to engage in R&D.  In this case, there may be an additional 
incentive to include the grant-back clause to avoid rent dissipation in R&D competition.  
However, this may be socially harmful if the outcome is a collusive level of R&D.   Second, 
innovation was assumed to occur anyway regardless of the number of firms capable of 
innovating.   Also by ignoring discounting, the R&D game had the feature of a constant-sum 
game.  Only who develops first matters, not when the innovation actually occurs.   If we amend 
the game to account for these omissions, the merit of licensing the core technology vs. the 
peripheral technology will depend on the tradeoff between duplication and diversification in the 
R&D process. 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
 The market for information is replete with imperfection and this is reflected in the 
structure of licensing agreements.  In this paper, I develope an incomplete contract model of 
technology transfer that accounts for market imperfection. More specifically,  noncontractible 
aspects of technology transfer that have been largely ignored in the literature, are explicitly 
introduced in the analysis of licensing.  The result is a framework that brings the model of 
licensing closer to reality and  generates predictions consistent with empirical findings.   
 First of all, the introduction of inputs that are not contractible and costly explains the 
prevalence of royalty contracts in the licensing relationship.  Moreover the model was able to 
relate the size of the royalty rate to the parameters that represent the circumstances under which 
the concerned parties operate.  The framework also provides a rigorous evaluation of the recent 
debate over the issue of technology licensing and competitiveness in the global economy.  In 
addition, the difficulty that the licensor faces in controlling the use of information in the 
development of related products in the future can also explain the rationale for including grant-
back clauses in licensing contracts.  Finally, the model can be naturally extended to analyze the 
choice of a technology holder between direct investment and licensing in an attempt to serve a 
foreign market.   
 My model may have implications for the dynamics in the formulation and implementation 
of technology policy for developing countries, which often pursue active government policies 
aimed at the creation of indigenous capacity.  In fear of foreign dependency and/or for the 
purpose of strengthening the bargaining power of domestic firms, governments often require their 
own approval of foreign licensing agreements.  In the approval process, governments restrict the 
type of contracts in order to preclude constraints that may be imposed by foreign nationals on 
 28
local firms' efforts to develop their own capability.   However, as the economy matures and 
threatens to be a competitor to potential licensors, it may even be necessary to allow foreign 
suppliers greater control and favorable terms in order to have any chance of securing continued 
access to advanced foreign technologies; it may be counterproductive to insist on restrictive 
technology policy as the economy matures.  In this respect, it is illuminating to observe that in the 
beginning of 1980 Korea abolished all restrictions imposed on terms and conditions of foreign 
licensing as it found it increasingly difficult to obtain state-of-the-art technologies [see Kim and 
Dahlman (1992)].25  
 In order to focus on the implications of the cost of transfer for optimal contractual forms, 
I considered the licensing relationship between two firms serving segmented markets.  This 
paper, therefore, deliberately ignored the effect of payoff interdependence that can arise from 
downstream competition between the licensor and licensee or among potential licensees, which 
was the main concern in the traditional licensing literature [see, for example,  Katz and Shapiro 
(1985), Kamien and Tauman (1986), Gallini and Winter (1985), etc.].   To merge these two 
distinct but complementary approaches would be a logical step for future research.   
                                                                 
25In the  face of increasing reluctance to transfer technology by firms in industrially-advanced countries, 
Korean firms also resorted to the strategy of setting up  "antennas"  which serve as technological outposts.  
For example, several Korean firms (especially major chaebols) have set up outposts in Silicon Valley to 
leapfrog into state-of-the-art technologies by monitoring technological changes and to acquire advanced 
semiconductor and computer technologies [see Kim (1993)]. 
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Appendix 
 This appendix proves that s'(r) >0 for sufficiently small values of positive r if we assume 
that the Nash equilibrium in the choice of effort level is stable.   The equilibrium in effort levels by 
the licensor and the licensee with the royalty rate r, (s(r), b(r)), is defined by the pair of first-
order conditions (4) and (5).  Totally differentiating these first-order conditions gives us: 
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It is readily seen that s' (r) can be written as   
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D > 0.  Therefore, the sign of s'(r)  is the same as the sign of the numerator in Eq. (A.2), which 
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For r sufficiently close to zero, the value of the numerator, (A.3), can be approximated by 
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), which is positive since the expression in the bracket is negative by the 
second order condition. 
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